We perform comparative statics for a general model of asymmetric oligopoly and derive a concise formula for the response of one firm to a marginal change in its rival's strategic variable, taking into account the responses of all other firms. We obtain the conditions under which the sign of this response coincides with that of the mixed second-order partial derivative of the firm's payoff function. We then propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationships (i.e., strategic substitute and complement).
Introduction
Oligopoly models have been used extensively in many fields of economics, including industrial organization, international trade, public economics, and environmental economics. Comparative statics of oligopolistic equilibria is important to examine the effects of various policies and certain exogenous events. Dixit's (1986) seminal work demonstrated a number of useful properties of comparative statics for oligopoly. However, his analysis addresses only oligopoly with a homogeneous good. Several studies have investigated oligopolistic equilibria's stability conditions (e.g., Hahn, 1962; Seade, 1980; Dixit, 1986 ; Leahy and Neary, 1997) but have dealt with only symmetric oligopolies or oligopolies for a homogeneous good. To our knowledge, no previous study has identified stability conditions for asymmetric oligopoly with a differentiated good.
Models of asymmetric oligopoly have been applied to many fields. 1 However, these existing studies introduce asymmetry into oligopolistic models in a specific manner, and no study has analyzed asymmetric oligopoly in a general framework.
For comparative statics, it is worthwhile to generalize to asymmetric oligopoly. For example, suppose you want to know the equilibrium response of one firm (say firm j) to another firm's (say firm i) marginal deviation from the initial Nash equilibrium. Because all other firms also respond to firm i's deviation, in general, you need to take into account the effects of all other firms' equilibrium responses on the response of firm j. However, under symmetry, the analysis is very simple as far as the sign of the equilibrium response of firm j is concerned. This is because the sign of firm j's response to firm i's deviation, taking into account all other firms' equilibrium response, is always the same as that ignoring all other firms' equilibrium response. Consequently, all you need to know is the sign of the second-order partial derivative of firm j's payoff function with respect to firm i's and firm j's strategic variables. generalize the model to asymmetric oligopoly with a differentiated good, in contrast, this useful property no longer holds. 2 Thus, you must investigate more than the sign of the second-order partial derivative of firm j's payoff function. In this note, we derive a concise formula for the equilibrium response of firm j to a marginal deviation of firm i from the initial Nash equilibrium, taking into account the equilibrium response of all other firms, which has been overlooked by previous studies. We also derive conditions under which the property of symmetric oligopoly passes through to asymmetric oligopoly.
Finally, we propose a distinction between gross and net strategic relationship (i.e., strategic substitute and complement) among strategic variables for firms.
Our result has broad application. It can be applied to the analysis of various government policies, such as taxes and subsidies. It is also applicable to certain exogenous shocks such as labor strikes (e.g.,
Gauder and Salant, 1991) and cost reductions (e.g., Février and Linnemer, 2004 ) that disturb the firms'
production. This note provides a useful tool to studies in many fields of economics that employ oligopoly models.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and proves the study's main results. Section 3 provides concluding remarks.
Comparative Statics for a General Model of Oligopoly
Consider an oligopoly model with n firms, where n ≥ 3 is fixed. (Dixit, 1986) . Alternatively, it may capture exogenous events such 2 The useful property also holds under asymmetric oligopoly if firms produce a homogeneous good.
3 Because duopoly is easy to handle, we focus on the case of more than three firms.
as a strike or merger (Gaudet and Salant, 1991) . The function π i (·) is assumed to be twice continuously differentiable. We focus on a one-shot simultaneous-move game.
Assuming firms' Nash behavior, the first-order condition (FOC) for firm i is given by
which yields firm i's reaction function as
As usual, n simultaneous equations given by Eq. (2) are solved to obtain Nash equilibria. In the subsequent analysis, we focus on an interior solution.
Totally differentiate Eq. (1) to yield
where 
Thus, it holds that 
where the FOC (Eq. (1)) is used to obtain the second equality. Thus, in addition to the signs of ∂π r /∂θ i and ∂π r /∂x j , we need to know the sign of dx j /dθ i to determine the sign of dπ r /dθ i . In the general model of oligopoly formulated above, we apply Cramer's rule to Eq. (3) to yield
It is often the case that π
In symmetric oligopoly, A and B respectively have the following structure:
where det( 
If r = i, then the first term on the right-hand side is equal to zero from the FOC (Eq. (1)). To sign dπ r /dx i , we need to know the signs of all of dx j /dx i terms. Although Gaudet and Salant (1991) analyze a similar issue, they focus only on the symmetric case. As we discussed in the introduction, under symmetric oligopoly the sign of dx j /dx i is always the same as the sign of the partial derivative π Then, firm j's equilibrium response to firm i's marginal deviation is formulated in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Assume that det(A) ̸ = 0. At Nash equilibrium, it holds that
Proof. Denote the i-th column of the matrix A by
Denote an (n − 1) × 1 column vector obtained by removing from A 
Denote an (n − 1) × 1 column vector obtained by removing from z its i-th entry and dividing other entries by its i-th entry by
Then, by dx j /dx i , j ̸ = i, we analyze the effect of a marginal change in x i on x j at the initial Nash equilibrium. This can be done by solving (n − 1) simultaneous equations of
The system of the simultaneous equations can be expressed as
Given that A ii is invertible, this can be solved as
where
ii is the inverse of A ii . Now, construct an (n − 1)
, which is defined as
where A ik, il denotes the (n − 2) × (n − 2) submatrix of A that is obtained by removing from A its i-th and k-th row and i-th and l-th columns for k, l ̸ = i. Then, the transporse of C(A ii ) is called the adjoint of A ii , and is denoted as Adj(A ii ):
It is known that
then Eq. (12) can be rewritten as
In the right-hand side of Eq. (13),
The j-th entry of this column vector is
Note that, as shown below, A ii is non-singular under the sufficient condition for stability.
To determine the sign of dx j /dx i we need stability conditions. As Seade (1980, Theorem 1), Dixit (1986, p. 117), and Leahy and Neary (1997, Lemma 1) have shown, necessary conditions for stability in a symmetric n-firm oligopoly are
(−1)
Condition (15) 
Then, in a symmetric n-firm oligopoly, Leahy and Neary (2009, Lemma 1) have shown that
This is a special case of Eq. (11) . Under the necessary condition for stability (16) , λ + (n − 2)ρ < 0.
Thus, it holds that
That is, under symmetry the sign of firm j's equilibrium response to firm i's marginal deviation always coincides with the sign of the partial derivative π j ji . Thus, it does not matter whether the equilibrium responses of all other firms to firm i's deviation are taken into account.
We then generalize the necessary and sufficient conditions for stability to the case of asymmetric oligopoly. Necessary conditions for stability are
A sufficient condition for stability is given by strictly row diagonal dominance:
Note that, from the Levy-Desplanques theorem, a strictly diagonally dominant matrix is non-singular ii exist.
Let |M kl (A ij )| be the absolute value of the (k, l)th minor in A ij , which is the determinant of the (n − 2) × (n − 2) submatrix obtained by removing from A ij its k-th row and l-th column, where k ̸ = i and l ̸ = j. 4 Then, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Assume that (22) holds. Then, in
Then, since M ji (A ij ) is a principal minor of A ij , (23) follows from (22).
In the following lemma, we provide a condition under which the result (19) under symmetric oligopoly also holds under asymmetric oligopoly.
Lemma 3
Assume that stability conditions (20) - (22) hold. Then, in an asymmetric n-firm oligopoly,
such that j ̸ = i and π
at Nash equilibrium.
Proof. From Lemma 1, (11) holds. Then, it yields that
If (24) holds, then C ji (A ij ) dominates the other terms in parentheses in the numerator of (26) and hence it holds that
Since from (20) and (21) it holds that (−1) As is evident from the analysis in this note, the net and gross strategic relationships always coincide with each other under symmetric oligopoly and under oligopoly with a homogeneous product. However, under asymmetric oligopoly with a differentiated good, x j could be a gross strategic substitute to x i but a net strategic complement to x i . For policy makers who implement a policy before firms' actions, the net strategic relationship is more important for determining the optimal policy.
Lemma 3 implies that under condition (25) the sign of firm j's equilibrium response to firm i's marginal deviation, taking into account the responses of all other firms, is the same as the sign of the partial derivative of firm j's reaction function with respect to x i . 5 Let x j = R j (x −j ; θ) be firm j's reaction function obtained from firm j's FOC (Eq. (1)). Then, it yields that
Condition (24) ensures that in (28) the first term on the right-hand side dominates the sum of all other terms on the right-hand side.
5 I thank Ngo Van Long for suggesting this interpretation.
As is well known, (25) always holds if n = 2 because in ( 
Concluding Remarks
In this note, we performed comparative statics in a general framework of oligopoly. It can be applied to various types of competition among firms in oligopolistic markets, including standard price and quantity competition. The results obtained by previous studies such as Seade (1980) , Dixit (1986) , and Leahy and Neary (1997) are included as special cases of those in this note. Furthermore, by imposing specific assumptions on the structure of the model, this studie's formulas of comparative statics can apply to a number of uninvestigated issues. We encourage such applications.
